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By C. NICHOLAS MCKINNEY,M URIEL NIEDERLE, AND ALVIN E. ROTH*
Many entry-level labor markets (and quite a
few other markets) have at some point in their
history suffered from the “unraveling” of hiring
decisions. Unraveling is typically a dynamic
process, in which offers are made earlier from
year to year, and can come to be written quite
far before actual employment starts. In markets
that experience unraveling, applicants typically
receive “exploding” offers that must be ac-
cepted or rejected before other offers can be
received and considered. The causes of this
market failure are, however, still not well
understood.
1
In many markets there have been vigorous
and sustained efforts to halt the unraveling of
appointment dates. Efforts simply to impose
uniform appointment dates, without any market
structure to support them, have most often been
unsuccessful. Some markets have successfully
reorganized themselves around a centralized
clearinghouse, which permits matching at a uni-
form, efﬁcient time (Roth and Xiaolin Xing,
1994).
2
Not all centralized clearinghouses have been
successful. There is a good deal of empirical
evidence (see, e.g., Roth, 1984, 1991; Roth and
Xing, 1994) that a key element of the design of
a successful clearinghouse is whether it pro-
duces matches that are stable in the sense that
there exists no ﬁrm and worker who are not
matched to one another, but who would both
prefer to be matched to one another rather than
accepting the results of the centralized clearing-
house (cf., David Gale and Lloyd Shapley,
1962; Roth and Marilda Sotomayor, 1990).
3
Some unstable matching mechanisms, however,
have been observed to persist for years (see,
e.g., Roth, 1991), and a very few stable match-
ing mechanisms have been observed to fail.
4
We know of about 100 markets and submar-
kets organized by a stable matching mechanism
(often called simply a “match”), but we know of
only a handful in which a stable match was
abandoned after operating successfully for sev-
eral years. The gastroenterology market is the
only one of these for which we have been able
to gather evidence that suggests that the demise
of the match is primarily related to events
within the market itself. It therefore provides us
with a unique opportunity to investigate why a
stable centralized mechanism failed, while so
many others continue to be successfully used.
This is an issue of considerable interest to
market designers who are asked to consider how
and when stable clearinghouses may improve
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1 Roth and Xiaolin Xing, 1994, describe several dozen
such markets and submarkets. Two markets that have re-
cently been experiencing this kind of unraveling are the
market for law clerks for federal appellate judges (see
Christopher Avery et al., 2001), in which offers have been
made almost two years in advance of employment, and the
market for college admissions (Avery et al., 2003), in which
elite colleges admit a high percentage of their entering
classes “early decision.”
2 For possible effects of a match on wages, see Niederle
and Roth (2003a).
3 This is a bit of an oversimpliﬁcation. Many labor
markets have special features that complicate the deﬁnition
of stability (see, e.g., Roth and Elliott Peranson, 1999).
4 In theory, stability is neither a necessary nor sufﬁcient
condition for the success of a match (see Roth and Xing,
1994; Hao Li and Sherwin Rosen, 1998; Li and Wing Suen,
2000; Suen, 2000).
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5 While it seems clear that
centralized matches that produce unstable out-
comes have been unsuccessful in organizing
markets, we do not know when stable matches
are successful. Understanding this will help us
understand what other markets, which currently
do not have a centralized match, may be able to
successfully introduce a match; and which of
the markets that now have a successful match
may be prone to fail (and what could be done to
help them). Finally, understanding the failure of
a centralized match, and hence better under-
standing environments in which a centralized
match succeeds, may also help us understand
how decentralized markets of this kind clear, or
fail to.
To address the reasons for the market failure
in the gastroenterology market, after consider-
ing the history of the market prior to the col-
lapse of the match, we will turn to laboratory
experiments. The available ﬁeld data, while
suggesting hypotheses about the cause of the
collapse (some of them put forward by market
participants), do not allow these hypotheses to
be distinguished, because they are all consistent
with the history of the market. Experiments in the
laboratory allow us to reproduce and vary, on a
small scale, different conditions of supply and
demand—and the kind of shocks experienced by
the gastroenterology labor market just prior to the
collapse of the match—in ways that the single
observation of the history of the market cannot.
I. The Gastroenterology Market
The history of the market for GI fellowships
(so called because of the older name of Gastro-
Intestinal disease) is similar to that of many
medical labor markets (Roth, 1984; Roth and
Xing, 1994). Before 1985, it suffered from the
unraveling of appointment dates, and a number
of solutions were attempted prior to the adop-
tion of a centralized match (Lauren B. Gerson,
1999). In 1986, the Medical Specialties Match-
ing Program (MSMP) was initiated to establish
a uniform appointment date and to permit ap-
plicants to complete at least two years of resi-
dency before deciding which subspecialty to
pursue. The fellowship clearinghouse was con-
ducted a year in advance, i.e., after two years of
internal medicine residency and one year before
employment would begin (NRMP, 1999). Ap-
plicants and fellowship programs submitted
rank order lists of positions and applicants, re-
spectively, that are processed to produce a sta-
ble match.
After 1996, however, the centralized match
broke down and was abandoned. In 1996,
around 300 positions participated in the match;
by 1999 there were only 14; and in 2000 no
centralized match for gastroenterologists was
even attempted.
The demise of the match seems to have been
set in motion in 1993–1994, when gastroenter-
ology subjected itself to a manpower analysis
commissioned by the Gastroenterology Leader-
ship Council (GLC) (Gregg S. Meyer et al.,
1996). Its main conclusions were that the U.S.
health care system and gastroenterologists
would beneﬁt from a reduction in gastroenter-
ology fellowship programs. The GLC endorsed
a goal of 25 percent to 50 percent reduction in
the number of GI fellows over ﬁve years. Fur-
thermore, an additional year of training was
mandated: starting in the summer of 1996, three
years of training, instead of two, were required
to be board eligible.
That is, in 1996 the supply of gastroenterol-
ogy fellowships was sharply reduced, by admin-
istrative decision, and the time needed to
become a gastroenterologist was increased by a
year (although some three-year fellowship pro-
grams existed before 1996). This announced
(and hence expected) reduction in supply, how-
ever, triggered an even larger reduction in the
number of residents who applied for GI fellow-
ships. This seems to have been the start of the
demise of the match. In 1996, for the ﬁrst time,
and despite the reduction in the number of
positions offered, there were fewer applicants
for GI fellowship positions than there were
5 Understanding under what conditions stable matches
succeed is of lively interest in several contemporary design
efforts. In New York City, the Department of Education
initiated a stable match for the approximately 100,000 mid-
dle school graduates who entered high school in September
2004 (Atila Abdulkadirog ˘lu, Parag A. Pathak, and Roth,
2005). In Boston, a study of the existing, unstable matching
system is currently underway, with the goal of recommend-
ing design changes. (In this connection, see Abdulkadirog ˘lu,
Pathak, Roth, and Tayfun So ¨nmez, 2005.) A recent antitrust
suit against the National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP) prompted new legislation clarifying that such a
match does not violate antitrust laws (Public Law, 2004)
and raised questions about how possible modiﬁcations in the
match would change the performance of the market (Jeremy
Bulow and Jonathan Levin, 2004; Vincent P. Crawford, 2004).
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siderable reduction in the supply of positions,
the market experienced a shortage in demand
for positions, as residents stayed away from the
market. This seems to have triggered a scramble
among fellowship programs (see, e.g., Gerson,
1999). Once the match broke down, and the
commitment to uniform late appointment dates
vanished, the market for gastroenterology fel-
lows once again experienced unraveling and
exploding offers (William T. Bauer et al.,
1999).
One hypothesis about what caused the de-
mise of the gastroenterology match, put forward
by market participants in the gastroenterology
literature, is that a centralized match can work
only when there is a surplus of applicants (Fred
S. Gorelick, 1999; Phillip P. Toskes, 1999).
Of course, there may be different kinds of
perceived shortages of applicants. There may
simply be fewer applicants than positions, as in
1996. A more subtle kind of shortage is that
there may not be enough “high-quality” appli-
cants to ﬁll the high-quality positions. Indeed,
the perception among some GI fellowship di-
rectors is that, even though there are now once
again more applicants than positions, there are
not enough high-quality applicants. Of course,
such perceived shortages can also arise in the
eyes of applicants, regardless of the number of
positions available. In many markets, there ap-
pears to be a perception among participants on
both sides of the market that they are on the
long side (i.e., there are never enough high-
quality opportunities on the other side of the
market) (cf., Toskes, 1998).
The matching algorithm used by the NRMP
to conduct the medical matches generates a
stable outcome regardless of any shortages of
positions or applicants. The incentives, how-
ever, for programs and applicants to participate
in the centralized match, or strike a deal outside
the match, may change in response to changes
in supply and demand.
Before we present further hypotheses about
the demise of the GI match, we ﬁrst need to
consider the difference in the strategic options
facing ﬁrms (fellowship programs) and appli-
cants. Two asymmetries seem particularly im-
portant in the present instance:
(a) Asymmetry of actions: In both centralized
and decentralized markets, applicants apply
to ﬁrms to be considered for a position (e.g.,
apply for an interview). In decentralized
markets, or when ﬁrms do not wait for a
centralized market, ﬁrms then make offers,
and applicants decide whether to accept or
reject them.
(b) Asymmetry of information following a
shock: Receipt of applications gives ﬁrms
an informational advantage; they know if
they are getting many or few applications,
and hence they have an early indication of
shifts in the demand for positions. In con-
trast, information about the supply of po-
sitions is common to both ﬁrms and
applicants, since available positions are
announced well in advance. And in the
absence of a shock, historical information
will be a reliable guide to both ﬁrms and
applicants.
This suggests three related hypotheses about
why the shortage of applicants for gastroenter-
ology positions in 1996 set off the collapse of
the match. Each is a special case of the previous
hypothesis:
(a) The success of this kind of match depends
on there being more applicants than posi-
tions: the centralized match fails when there
are fewer applicants.
(b) The match failed because there was a shock
that reduced the demand for positions be-
low the supply, but the match could have
recovered from this shock if given the
chance, once supply and demand stabilized.
(c) The match failed because there was a shock
that reduced the demand for positions be-
low the supply, and because ﬁrms knew this
(because they could see their reduced appli-
cant pool) and applicants didn’t. However,
the match could have recovered from this
shock if given the chance, once supply and
demand stabilized, since then applicants
would no longer be at an information dis-
advantage to ﬁrms.
While all three hypotheses take as their basis
the fact that the gastroenterology match started
to unravel the ﬁrst year in which demand for
positions was lower than supply, they differ in
their implications for a reorganization of the
gastro match, for what we should expect to ﬁnd
in other markets with and without successful
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supply and demand shocks might be managed
in the future.
II. Experiments
We create a simple matching environment in
which to study the effects of both stationary im-
balances in supply and demand and of shocks that
create a shortage of applicants. In each experimen-
tal condition, subjects ﬁrst gain experience of un-
raveling by participating in 15 decentralized
markets. They then participate in 15 markets in
which centralized matching is available to sub-
jects who choose to wait and use it. In the treat-
ments that involve a shock, the shock occurs after
the thirtieth market, and subjects participate in an
additional 15 markets after the shock, with cen-
tralized matching available for those who wait to
use it. (We use single shocks that reverse imbal-
ance between demand and supply of positions,
such as we observed in the market for gastroen-
terology fellowship positions.) Firms and appli-
cants are always fully informed about the number
and types of ﬁrms in the market. We vary the
information that applicants have about other ap-
plicants, and examine markets either with full in-
formation, in which ﬁrms and applicants have the
same information about supply and demand, or
partial information, in which only ﬁrms are di-
rectly informed about the number of applicants.
(The partial information condition is intended to
let us observe the market in conditions like that of
the 1996 shock to the gastro market, which unex-
pectedly reduced the number of applicants.)
A. The Environment
6
Participants in the experiment are assigned
the role of either a ﬁrm or a worker (i.e., an
applicant for work), of one of two types, high or
low. Each subject maintained the same role
(e.g., as a high ﬁrm) throughout all the markets
in an experimental session, and no subject par-
ticipated in more than one session.
7 In each
market, ﬁrms can match to at most one worker,
and each worker can match to at most one ﬁrm.
For each participant, a match to a high type is
worth 150 points plus or minus a private value
between 0 and 10 points. A match to a low type
is worth 150 points plus or minus a private
value between 0 and 10 points. Participants
know other participants’ types, but not their
private values (although each participant knows
his own private values for others).
Markets are divided into three periods, and in
each period, ﬁrms that are not yet matched can
make up to one offer. After all the ﬁrms make
offers (or choose not to make an offer), workers
accept or reject offers. An offer contains the
type and an identiﬁcation of the ﬁrm that made
that offer. A worker who receives several offers
sees them only one at a time, in a random order.
That is, these are “exploding” offers: a worker
must choose to accept or reject each offer with-
out knowing whether he has any more offers
coming in that period. Workers can accept only
one offer per market. Accepted offers are an-
nounced to all participants in any subsequent
period, while unaccepted offers remain private.
Matched ﬁrms are no longer allowed to make
offers and unmatched ﬁrms cannot make offers
to matched workers.
In the gastroenterology labor market, costs of
unraveling consist of many components for
both ﬁrms and workers, including uncertainty
about the quality of the match and loss of plan-
ning ﬂexibility. In our experiment, we model
these various costs simply by imposing a ﬁxed
cost of contracting early (as in Kagel and Roth,
2000). In particular, each market lasts for three
periods, denoted periods 2, 1, and 0. To
model costs of unraveling, each participant who
matches in period 2 incurs a cost of 20 points,
and each participant who matches in period 1
incurs a cost of 10 points. The penalties for
matching early are deducted from the partici-
pants’ earnings. Subjects who failed to match
by the end of period 0 receive 0 points for that
6 Our environment is similar to the experimental envi-
ronment in John H. Kagel and Roth (2000), with some small
procedural changes. So our results prior to the introduction
of shocks serve to replicate their results and add conﬁdence
that they are not the artifact of some of the speciﬁc proce-
dural choices. The imbalances in demand and supply, and
the shocks that are the subject of this experiment, are unlike
the treatments in prior experiments.
7 In the gastroenterology market, like other entry-level
labor markets, only employers tend to participate in many
markets. Applicants, however, have many opportunities to
learn from and about the experience of previous years from
colleagues, advisors, and publications. For simplicity, the
present experimental design gives both sides of the market
experience in the same way.
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point plus a $10 show-up fee.
There are two kinds of markets:
(a) In a decentralized market, ﬁrms have three
periods to match by making offers to work-
ers, who can accept or reject the offers.
(b) In a centralized market, the ﬁrst two periods
are as in the decentralized market. But in the
last period, period 0, all ﬁrms and workers
who have not already matched in periods
2 and 1 are matched at the ﬁrm-optimal
stable matching.
8
In each experimental treatment there are three
low-type ﬁrms and three low-type workers. We
vary the number of high-type ﬁrms and workers
to induce demand and supply imbalances and
the kinds of demand shocks as experienced by
the gastroenterology market.
Fixed Demand Treatments.—To test for ef-
fects of demand and supply imbalances, we
have three treatments, determined by the num-
ber of high-type ﬁrms and workers. “3 Firms–3
Workers” is the treatment in which there are
three high-type ﬁrms and three high-type work-
ers (in addition to the three low-type ﬁrms and
workers). We compare the outcome of the four
sessions of this balanced treatment to the seven
sessions in which there is excess supply of
workers (3 Workers–2 Firms) and the seven
sessions in which there is an excess supply of
ﬁrms (3 Firms–2 Workers). In all three treat-
ments, both ﬁrms and workers are informed
about demand and supply, and participate in 15
decentralized markets followed by 15 central-
ized markets.
The Shock Treatments.—The shock treat-
ments started out with three high-type ﬁrms and
four high-type workers. Then, after market 30,
there was a single shock, eliminating two high-
type workers and hence resulting in a shortage
of workers from markets 31 to 45.
9 We ran 10
sessions of each of those treatments.
10
The shock conditions were conducted under
one of two information conditions, full or par-
tial information. (The conditions without a
shock were all conducted under full informa-
tion.) In both information conditions, ﬁrms and
workers are fully informed about the number
and quality of ﬁrms in the market. Firms also
know the number and quality of workers. The
information condition affected whether workers
know about the number and quality of workers.
(a) Full information: Workers are fully in-
formed about the number and types of
workers in each market. So when there is a
shock that changes the number of workers,
the workers know about the shock as soon
as the ﬁrms do.
(b) Partial information: Workers are not in-
formed about the number and types of
workers in each market. So when there is a
shock that changes the number of workers,
only the ﬁrms can see the shock at the start
of the market. Workers ﬁnd out about other
workers only when early matches are
made.
11
B. Experimental Results
As in Kagel and Roth (2000), the data are
best explained by examining the high-type par-
ticipants, since low types almost universally
participate in the centralized match once it be-
comes available.
12 To ﬁlter out the high-low or
low-high matches that occur from the imbal-
ance of supply and demand, in each market we
8 When the MSMP operated the gastroenterology match,
a version of the ﬁrm-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
was used. For ongoing matches, the MSMP subsequently
followed the NRMP in adopting the Roth-Peranson (1999)
algorithm, built around an applicant-optimal deferred-
acceptance algorithm.
9 Under the full information design, the two workers who
drop out after market 30 collect their payments and leave,
while the others ﬁnish the last 15 markets. In the partial
information condition, these two workers are told to remain
quietly at their workstations so as not to signal to the other
participants that they have been removed from the market.
10 All ﬁxed market sessions and four of each of the shock
sessions were run in the winter and spring of 2001–2002.
Six sessions of the shock treatments were run in the summer
of 2003.
11 Accepted offers are made public, along with the type
and identity of the ﬁrm and worker.
12 Figures for the low-type participants, screen shots of
the experimental conditions, and experimental instructions
are found in McKinney et al. (2004) and are also available
at http://www.stanford.edu/niederle/gastro.experiment.
pdf.
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market. That is, we are concerned whether the
maximal number of possible high-high matches
are achieved in each market.
Figure 1 graphs the percentage of high-to-
high matches that are made late (i.e., in period
0). For the sessions that experienced shocks in
the balance of supply and demand following
market 30, the ﬁgure shows how participation in
the centralized clearinghouse reacted to the
shock, in both the short term (markets 31–35),
and over the longer term (markets 31–45), un-
der the new post-shock conditions of worker
shortage.
To analyze the data, for each session we use
averages over ﬁve markets (as in Figure 1) as
data points. To analyze differences within treat-
ments, we use the Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-rank test, while we use the Mann Whit-
ney test for differences across treatments.
The Effects of a Centralized Match under
Constant Market Conditions.—For all ﬁve
treatments, the decentralized market exhibits
substantial early contracting. Furthermore, mar-
kets 6–10 experience the same amount of late
contracting as markets 11–15.
For all ﬁve treatments, the introduction of the
centralized match increases the percentage of
matches that are made efﬁciently late: markets
16–20 are signiﬁcantly different from markets
11–15 in all treatments.
13 The success of the
match is virtually the same across conditions.
14,15
13 The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, com-
paring the proportion of late matching in markets 11–15
with the proportion of late matching in markets 16–20 in the
10 pairs of each of the full and partial information treat-
ments, yields p-values of 0.04 and 0.01, respectively. Sim-
ilar Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests yield
p-values of 0.07 for the four pairs in the 3 Firms–3 Workers
treatment, 0.02 for the seven pairs in the 3 Firms–2 Workers
treatment, and 0.03 for the seven pairs in the 2 Firms–3
Workers treatment.
14 Comparing the percentage of late matches in markets
26–30 across all conditions using the Mann Whitney test,
we ﬁnd p-values that are 0.4 or higher.
15 For all the markets in which there are three possible
matches between high-type agents, the effectiveness of the
centralized match increases as the participants gain experi-
ence with it: there is signiﬁcantly more late matching in
markets 26–30 than in markets 16–20. The Wilcoxon
FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF HIGH MATCHES THAT ARE MADE IN PERIOD 0
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when there was a shortage of workers, a cen-
tralized market was effective in increasing the
percentage of late matches. This increase in late
matches is due to a somewhat more efﬁcient
period 0 matching mechanism, and mostly to a
reduction in early matchings.
16
There is no suggestion in the data that cen-
tralized matches work well only when supply
and demand are balanced, or only when ﬁrms
are on the short side of the market. In each of
the experimental sessions with no shocks (or
before the shock), the centralized match, once
introduced, achieved a steady rate of participa-
tion, suggesting that it is robust to varying con-
ditions of supply and demand. Our results
replicate and extend those of Kagel and Roth
(2000) to the current environment.
The Effect of the Shock.—We are now in a
position to consider the effect of the shock that
changes the market from one in which workers
are in excess supply to one in which they are in
short supply, starting in market 31. We have
already seen that the centralized mechanism is
widely adopted when it is available. In both
information conditions its adoption improves
efﬁciency, resulting in signiﬁcantly higher total
payoffs to ﬁrms and workers.
17 Prior to the
shock there are no important differences be-
tween the two information treatments.
18
Following the shock that removes two high-
type workers, unraveling reoccurs in markets
31–35 in both information conditions, but only
marginally in the full-information condition,
and signiﬁcantly in the partial-information con-
dition. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
rank test that compares the proportion of late
matches in markets 25–30 with that in markets
31–35 in the 10 matched pairs of the partial
information treatment yields a p-value of 0.01,
and the test in the full information treatment
yields a p-value of 0.26.
19
The impact of the shock is signiﬁcantly
greater in the partial information treatment. Par-
ticipation in the centralized match falls by 9.3
percent under full information, and 30 percent
under partial information when comparing
markets 31–35 with markets 26–30. A Mann-
Whitney test conﬁrms that the lack of informa-
tion leads to signiﬁcantly more unraveling (p 
0.05).
After the shock, the amount of unraveling
(early matching) in the partial information treat-
ment, 47 percent (in markets 31–35), is compa-
rable to the one in decentralized markets, 52
percent (in markets 11–15). A Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank test delivers a p-value of 0.33.
In contrast, under full information there is no-
where near as much unraveling after the shock
(24 percent) as there was in the decentralized
markets (55 percent): a Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank test yields a p-value of 0.007.
Furthermore, there is a signiﬁcant treatment ef-
fect; that is, the signiﬁcant change of unraveling
in the full information condition is signiﬁcantly
different from the (small) change in unraveling
in the partial information condition. A Mann-
Whitney test on the differences in the propor-
tion of early matches (n  20) delivers a
p-value of 0.058, a signiﬁcant effect.
matched-pairs signed-rank tests yield p-values of less than
0.01 for both the full and partial information treatment, and
yields p  0.07 for the 3 Firms–3 Workers treatment. When
there are only 2 high matches, the change is not signiﬁcant;
the p-values are 0.102 and 0.369, respectively.
16 Indeed, comparing the proportion of early matches in
markets 26–30 with the proportion in markets 11–15, a
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for the 10 pairs of
the full and partial information treatments yields p-values of
less than 0.01; for the four pairs of the 3 Firms–3 Workers
treatment the p-value is 0.068; and for the seven pairs of
each of the 2 Firms–3 Workers and the 3 Firms–2 Workers
treatment the p-values are 0.022 and 0.05, respectively.
17 A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test compar-
ing earnings in markets 16–20 with markets 11–15 in each
of the 10 pairs yields values of p  0.01 for both the full
information treatment and the partial information treatment.
18 Mann-Whitney tests comparing the average propor-
tion of late matching between the 10 sessions in each
treatment yield p-values of 0.44 for markets 11–15, the last
decentralized markets; 0.49 for markets 16–20, the ﬁrst
centralized markets; and 0.84 for markets 26–30, the last
centralized markets before the shock. Similar results are
obtained when looking at the proportion of early matches.
Furthermore, there are no differences in the changes in the
proportion in late matchings between the full and the partial
information treatment, for the introduction of the central-
ized match (markets 16–20 minus markets 11–15), the
increase in adoption of the match (markets 26–30 minus
markets 16–20), and the difference in late matching be-
tween the last centralized markets and the last decentralized
markets (markets 26–30 minus markets 11–15). Similar
results hold for the proportion of early matches.
19 Whenever a centralized match is in place, there are
virtually no high matches that fail to form; that is, the
reduction in participation in the centralized match almost
equals the increase of early matchings.
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about 80 percent of the participants are again
matching late (with at least half the groups
in each treatment having 100 percent late
matches). That is, the effect of the shock, minor
in the full information condition and much
larger in the partial information condition, is
transient in both conditions. The effect of work-
ers not having information about the number of
other workers diminishes as they gain experi-
ence of markets with no subsequent shocks in
the number of workers.
To understand the effect of the shock, and
why it affects the partial-information condition
so much more than the full-information condi-
tion, we look at the pattern of early offers by
high-quality ﬁrms to high-quality workers, and
the high-quality workers’ acceptance or rejec-
tion of these offers following the shock. We will
see that, after the shock, when there is a short-
age of high-type workers, ﬁrms increase the
number of early offers they make. But the work-
ers accept these offers much less frequently in
the full-information condition, in which they
know they are now on the short side of the
market, than in the partial-information condition.
Figure 2 shows the normalized percentage of
high-type workers who receive an offer from a
high-type ﬁrm, and the solid part of the bar
shows the proportion that accept those offers.
The percentages are normalized once again by
the number of high-type participants on the
short side of the market, and also by the number
of high-type participants remaining on the mar-
ket. That is, we report the number of high-type
workers who receive an offer from a high-type
ﬁrm divided by the number of high-type work-
ers who could have received an offer from a
high-type ﬁrm, had all the (remaining) high-
type ﬁrms made offers to different high-type
workers. (The numerical percentage on top of
the bar and the height of the solid part of the bar
indicate the percentage of these offers that were
accepted.)
Behavior in the decentralized markets is not
surprising. In both treatments the ﬁrms are
aware that they are in short supply, but to avoid
congestion in period 0, a number of early offers
are made and most are accepted. In markets
16–30, the centralized match solves the conges-
tion problem and removes the incentives for
high-quality ﬁrms to make early offers to high-
quality applicants. The number of such offers
falls signiﬁcantly.
20 The proportion of early
(period 1) offers continues to fall as market
participants become experienced with the cen-
tralized match.
21
After the shock, ﬁrms are now on the long
side of the market and have incentives to make
early offers to secure a high-type applicant. In
both treatments, offers in period 1 increase
signiﬁcantly, by 49 and 62 percentage points,
for the complete and partial information treat-
ment respectively (with Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank tests comparing separately in
each of the ten pairs markets 26–30 with mar-
kets 31–35, yielding p-values below 0.01 in
each case).
However, the reaction of applicants differs
sharply between treatments. While ﬁrms have
an incentive to make early offers to secure a
high-type applicant, applicants now would do
better not to accept such early offers. In the
partial information treatment, however, appli-
cants are unaware of this change: 55 percent of
the workers accept offers made in period 1i n
markets 31–35, compared to 32 percent under
full information. (The difference between the
two information conditions is signiﬁcant; the
Mann Whitney test (n  20) yields a p-value 
0.0373.)
Overall, our experimental results show that a
shock to the number of applicants that reverses
the imbalance of supply and demand and makes
applicants the short side of the market, like the
one that the gastroenterology market experi-
enced in 1996, can affect participation rates in
the match. The experiments show that this is
particularly so when workers do not realize that
20 The proportion of high-quality applicants who receive
an offer from a high-quality ﬁrm in period 1 falls by 18
percent after the introduction of the centralized match (mar-
kets 16–20) in the complete information treatment, and by
22 in the partial information treatment, compared to the
average proportion over the last ﬁve markets before the
match (markets 11–15). Both reductions are signiﬁcant; a
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test on each of the ten
pairs yields p-values of 0.07 and 0.01, respectively. Com-
paring the ten pairs of markets 6–10 with 11–15 yields no
signiﬁcant effect (p  0.4) and only changes of 3 or 4
percentage points.
21 From markets 16–20 to 26–30 (from the ﬁrst ﬁve to
the last ﬁve markets in the match before the shock), the
proportion of early offers falls by 20 and 18 percent for the
complete and partial information treatment, respectively, a
signiﬁcant difference (p  0.01 with a Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank test).
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market. The results thus tend to support our
third hypothesis, that the match failed because
there was a shock that reduced the demand for
positions below the supply, and because ﬁrms
knew this and applicants did not. (Recall how
the low demand for positions in 1996 was an
unexpected shock.)
III. Connections to Other Markets
A large part of economics is devoted to in-
vestigating what markets accomplish at equilib-
rium. But we know much less about the
mechanics of how markets clear, or fail to. This
gap in what we know is particularly acute for
markets, like labor markets, in which workers
FIGURE 2. OFFERS,A CCEPTANCES, AND REJECTIONS
Notes: The percent on the vertical axis is normalized by the number of high-type participants on the short side of the market
who are still available. Thus, in markets 1–30, a bar of total height 100 percent in period 2 would imply that each of the
three high ﬁrms made offers to a different high-type worker. A bar of total height 100 percent in period 1 or 0 implies that
all remaining high-type workers minus one (as high-type workers are on the long side of the market) receive an offer from
a high ﬁrm. (The numerical percentage on top of the bar, and the height of the solid part of the bar, indicate the percentage
of these offers that were accepted.) After the shock, in markets 31–45, a total height of 100 percent in period 2 implies that
both of the high-type workers received at least one offer from a high ﬁrm. In period 1 or 0, a total height of 100 percent
implies that each remaining high-type worker received an offer from a high ﬁrm.
886 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2005and jobs are heterogeneous, and so an offer is
not just a price offered to the whole market, as
in a ﬁnancial or commodity market. Market
failures offer a window through which to inves-
tigate this process, and the gastroenterology
market offered a particularly clean transition
from a late, efﬁcient market organization to one
with early, dispersed offers.
In the laboratory, we can see that when
matchings become early, they become inefﬁ-
cient, in that they don’t maximize the sum of
participants’ welfare. And in the ﬁeld data,
Niederle and Roth (2003b) found that when
gastroenterology fellowship positions were of-
fered through a centralized clearinghouse, the
market became signiﬁcantly more national than
it was before the match, or since its demise. The
mobility of GI fellows, as measured by whether
their GI fellowship is in the same hospital, city,
or state as their former residency, signiﬁcantly
increased with the use of a centralized match.
22
For many markets (and marketplaces), the
ability to achieve efﬁcient gains from trade has
to do with some aspect of the thickness of the
market, of how many possible transactions can
simultaneously be considered. Dispersion of of-
fers in time is one of the things that can dimin-
ish a market’s thickness, since agents on both
sides of the market are faced with sequences of
choices among very few alternatives.
Our results suggest that markets unravel, and
thickness is lost, when applicants lose their abil-
ity to reject early exploding offers. In the gas-
troenterology market, this seems to have
resulted from a situation that temporarily cre-
ated incorrect beliefs about supply and demand.
More generally, unraveling requires conditions
in which there are both ﬁrms that want to make
early offers and applicants who want to accept
them. To create thickness, a market must be
attractive enough so that participants want to
wait to transact in it, and safe enough for them
to do so (Niederle and Roth, 2004b).
This generalizes to other contemporary mar-
ket failures as well. The market in which federal
appellate judges in the United States hire new
graduates of top law schools as law clerks has
also been afﬂicted with unraveling of appoint-
ment dates. In that market, applicants are strik-
ingly reluctant to reject offers by federal judges
who have interviewed them, and indeed it is
sometimes an explicit condition for receiving an
interview that an offer will be accepted if made
(Avery et al., 2001; Edward R. Becker et al.,
1994; Ernan Haruvy et al., forthcoming). Much
of the market for admission to elite undergrad-
uate colleges has moved early in a similar way,
with some colleges explicitly using “binding
early decision programs” that favor applicants
who apply early to only one college, on the
understanding that they will attend if accepted
(Avery et al., 2003). In both of these markets,
like the gastroenterology market, applicants are
at least sometimes faced with early options that
they may not hold and compare with other po-
tential offers.
The results of the present experiment suggest
the hypothesis that this ability to compare (and
reject) offers may be one of the critical but
fragile determinants of how well such markets
clear.
IV. Conclusions
The results of the experiment suggest that the
collapse of the gastroenterology match was re-
lated to the peculiar situation in which the gas-
troenterology profession found itself in the late
1990s. After a reduction in the number of gas-
troenterology positions, the market nevertheless
suffered such a shortfall in applicants that ap-
plicants were in shorter supply than positions.
Not only did this give fellowship programs in-
centives to ﬁll their positions early, it also made
applicants (who knew of the reduction in posi-
tions, but not of the shortage of well-qualiﬁed
applicants) eager to accept offers whenever they
received them.
The results of the experiment also suggest
why failures of stable matches are rare. Antic-
ipated imbalances in supply and demand, visi-
ble to both sides of the market, did not cause
declines in match participation of anywhere
near the magnitude caused by the unanticipated
shock that created a shortage of workers (which
workers were initially unaware of). And while
supply and demand shocks themselves may not
be rare in these labor markets, shocks that
change which is the short side of the market
appear to be quite rare. None of the other internal
22 Guillaume Frechette et al. (2004) show using Nielsen
ratings of college football bowl games that unraveling
caused inefﬁciencies in the early 1990s that have been
reduced by later matching.
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disease, pulmonary disease, and infectious dis-
ease) experienced such a shock.
23
Since the loss of the match, the number of
positions has again stabilized, raising the ques-
tion of whether this market might be able suc-
cessfully to employ a match again. Our results
suggest that a centralized match would once
again be successful. And reintroducing a cen-
tralized match would increase the scope of the
market and the mobility of gastroenterologists,
as well as allowing matches to be made after
more information has become available.
In summary, this paper exploits a rare event—
the failure of the stable matching mechanism used
to organize the market for gastroenterologists—to
explore how such clearinghouses fail, and why
failures are rare. The fact that the failure of the
gastroenterology match seems to have been the
result of an unusual, one-time shock to the market
helps us to advise gastroenterologists that it ap-
pears that a reintroduction of the match would
once again be successful.
24 And the fact that sim-
pler shocks do not disrupt the operation of the
match explains in part why this kind of clearing-
house has operated so successfully, over many
years, in markets that have certainly experienced
shocks in supply and demand.
More generally, while theories of equilibrium
do a good job of explaining what markets
should do when they clear, we have few de-
scriptions of how markets (especially those that
are not commodity or ﬁnancial markets) do
clear. The results of the experiment reported
here underline the importance of those elements
of the market environment that gave applicants
the conﬁdence to decline early offers.
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